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mately taken to eliminate police-community hostility, it is important
that it be taken now. Otherwise, the future may offer an increasing
number of cases like Lankford v. Gelston.
D. J. JONES, JR.
Constitutional Law-Power of Legislature to Disqualify
Members-Elect
Julian Bond, representative-elect to the Georgia General Assem-
bly, was not allowed to take the oath of office on the first day of the
session. Challenges to his qualifications were referred to a special
committee, that held hearings and recommended that he not be
seated. The House approved the recommendation and denied Bond
his seat. In Bond v. Floyd,1 Bond and two members of his constit-
uency sought to enjoin the exclusion. The three-judge District
Court, one judge dissenting, upheld the House action as a reasonable
exercise of its power to judge the qualifications of its members.
It found the House justified in declaring the strong anti-war state-
ment of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which
Bond supported and expanded on,' repugnant to the oath required
of House members to support the federal constitution. Thus, there
was no denial of due process.
The dissent did not reach the federal constitutional issues. Con-
struing the power of the House to judge the qualifications of its
members as limited to the qualifications specifically mentioned in
the state constitution,3 it would hold the House action void as in
violation of that constitution. The majority thought this a "restric-
tive view, unfounded in recognized authority."4  Both opinions
turned to the federal Congress for legislative precedents.
'251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga. 1966) reversed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4038
(U.S. Dec. 5, 1966). See note 75 infra.
2 Id. at 336, 337. The SNCC statement opposed the war aid declared
support for men who would not respond to the draft, calling for a "freedom
fight" at home as an alternative. Bond asserted that he fully supported the
statement, and added that he was a pacifist who admired the courage of
draft-card burners.
8 GA. CONsT. art. III, § VII, para. 1. This provision is substantially the
same as U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The qualifications mentioned in the Georgia
Constitution are citizenship, residency, age, no former conviction of a crime
of moral turpitude, and no holding of a civil or military office at the time
of election.
'251 F. Supp. at 340.
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In the most recent debate on congressional power to disqualify
members-elect, "the intent of the founding fathers" was seen by one
senator as "convincing" support for a finding that the power is un-
limited.5 The history of the relevant constitutional provisions has
been put to such use before, but that has been by no means its only
service.6 Another reading of the remarks invoked in both causes,
set in the context of 1787, may yield a better appreciation of "the
intent of the founding fathers."
The Pinckney draft of a federal constitution, presented on May
29, 1787, contained age, citizenship and residenc6 requirements for
members of the national legislature. It also provided that the House
should be the judge of the "elections, returns and qualifications" of
members, a provision which passed untouched to the final Constitu-
tion.7 This draft constitution was seldom referred to in the con-
vention, but provided a convenient skeleton for debate-and, more
important, was submitted on July 26, along with the resolutibns of
the entire body, to the committee of detail.8 In debate on qualifica-
tions, the delegates agreed on a minimum age of twenty-five for
Representatives, though Mr. Wilson objectedY Delegate Mason later
moved that the committee of detail include a clause setting minimum
requirements of property and citizenship.' Mr. Dickinson "was
against any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It was
impossible to make a complete one; and a partial one would, by
implication, tie up the hands of the legislature from supplying the
omissions."" Consistent with his earlier position, Wilson agreed,
on the grounds that "odious and dangerous characters" might then
be immune from disqualification. 12 Despite the Dickinson and Wil-
son views, occasionally quoted to show that Congress was not ex-
pected to be limited in disqualifying, the convention sent the Mason
resolution to the committee.' 3
'93 CONG. REc. 12 (1947). See also Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333,
341 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
'See, e.g., 1 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 477 (1907) [hereinafter cited as HINDS].
7 MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
129 (Elliot. ed. 1845).
Ild. at 375.0 Id. at 228.
'Id. at 370.
'lId. at 371.1Id. at 373.
1"Id. at 375
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The proposed constitution, reported on August 6, contained age,
citizenship and residence requirements as suggested by Pinckney. 4
Delegates were disappointed, however, by the treatment of the prop-
erty qualification, embodied in proposed art. VI, § 2: "The legisla-
ture of the United States shall have authority to establish such uni-
form qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to
property, as to the said legislature shall seem expedient."' 5 James
Madison voiced strong opposition to this grant of authority where no
authority had been proposed: "The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a republican government, and
ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the legislature could regu-
late either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution.""
When Gouverneur Morris moved to go further, and allow the
legislature complete freedom to set qualifications by striking "with
regard to property" from the section, Mr. Williamson thought, "This
would surely never be admitted.' 7 Reasserting the dangers of such
power, Madison pointed to parliamentary abuses as "a lesson worthy
of our attention." British legislators had regulated qualifications for
selfish, political or religious ends, he said. These objections were
evidently persuasive, for the Morris motion was defeated." Then,
before the final vote on art. VI, § 2, as reported, Mr. Wilson rose
to plead again for a wider concession of power to Congress. He
argued that the section be dropped because it "would constructively
exclude every other power of regulating qualifications." This time
Wilson was on the winning side, as the section was defeated.'9
But whether that action meant what he said it should is another
matter. His position seems feeble, in that the convention had al-
ready set, over his objections, citizenship and age qualifications, and
a residence requirement that he could be expected to dislike for the
same reasons. That art. VI, § 2, should have been proposed at all
bears out Wilson's and Dickinson's claims that a list of qualifications
would constructively exclude all others, leaving the legislature with-
out authority in this area unless granted elsewhere in the instrument.
The Morris amendment of the section would have come closest to
"I Id. at 377.
' Id. at 377.
'AId. at 404.
2" Id. at 404.
"I Id. at 404.
10 Id. at 404.
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Wilson's wishes, but it was soundly defeated. Interpreters of this
debate should find it as hard to deny Mr. Wilson's "inclusion of one
is exclusion of all others" argument, as to agree that because the
convention excluded one qualification, it meant to grant Congress
power to include all others.
Madison's strict view of congressional power in this area, as
may be expected, was promulgated in The Federalist. In discussing
the qualifications specified, Madison suggests that they are exclusive:
"Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
federal government is open to men of every description, whether
native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to pov-
erty or wealth or to any particular profession of religious faith."2
More persuasive, perhaps, is Hamilton's full agreement with this
construction, in a more definite statement: "The qualifications of
the persons who may choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked
upon on another occasion, are defined and fixed in the constitution,
and are unalterable by the legislature."21 Therefore, Hamilton con-
cluded, there need be no fear that Congress might succeed in barring
access to all but the rich; it has not the power.
Adherence to this theory has been somewhat erratic in Congress.
In times of unusual stress-post-Civil War, World War I, and a
period of national indignation at the marital habits of Mormons-
legislators have seen other values as superior. But it is insufficient
to discuss deviations as solely due to the pressure of events, for
each generation sees its own times as turbulent, and finds new re-
quirements for arbitrary action: the Vietnam dissenter today poses
the same threat as did the unreconstructed rebel a century ago.
A brief survey may reveal whether congressional practice in this
area has established a different rule, based on policies unrecognized
in 1787. If it has not, and if the policies then relied on remain
predominant, perhaps it is time to reiterate the limits on legislative
authority over qualifications.
It was early settled that the states could not add qualifications
for members of Congress to those prescribed in the Constitution.
In the contested election cases of Barney v. McCreery22 in the
" TnE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 249 (Hallowell ed. 1837).21 Id. No. 60, at 286.
2 Clarke & H. Elec. Cas. 167 (1807).
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House, and Lyman Trumbull23 in the Senate, candidates were seated
though they had not met state requirements. The Committee on
Elections' report in the McCreery case emphasized that Congress is
."sole judge" of qualifications.2 4 State courts have since uniformly
conceded Congress exclusive jurisdiction in this area.25 Indeed, they
have customarily adopted the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, suggested by the committee in McCreery as the broader
basis of its holding,28 in construing their own constitutional pro-
visions concerning qualifications.
The Senate, though it had apparently once deviated from strict
adherence to that hoary rule,28 did not squarely face the question
until 1862. Its answer then was in harmony with the Madisonian
view and the McCreery understanding. When Senator Fessenden
moved that Benjamin Stark's credentials be referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary for an investigation of alleged disloyalty,
he considered his action unprecedented. 29 The committee agreed, re-
fusing to go beyond an examination of the credentials, and recom-
mending that Stark be seated. 0 Senator Sumner argued that the
Constitution, by requiring an oath of office, had made loyalty a
necessary requirement."' This suggestion was sharply debated, and
"8 Hupman, Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, S. Doc. No.
71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962). [hereinafter cited as Hupman Elec. Cas.]
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807) [1789-1824].
See, e.g., Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, appeal dismissed,
340 U.S. 881 (1950); Odegard v. Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717
1963); State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d
04 (1946). Compare State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Swanson, 127 Neb. 806,
257 N.W. 255 (1934), with State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246,
6 N.W.2d 89 (1942). Contra, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 484 (1951).
2" 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877 (1807) [1789-1824]; accord, Wood v. Peters,
Mob. 79 (1889).
"*Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 (1853); Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578,
71 A.2d 352 (1950); Black v. Trower, 79 Va. 123 (1884). In Shub v.
Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950), an additional oath was upheld as
an effectuation of a loyalty requirement in the state constitution. As thus
interpreted, the oath was found constitutional in Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). The court in Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686
(N.Y. 1824), distinguished between an unconstitutional addition of qualifica-
tions and a constitutional disqualification as part of the punishment for
certain crimes.
" John M. Niles, 1 HINDs § 441. Niles' sanity was investigated before
he was seated. The dissent in the principal case notes that sanity is a
qualification mentioned in the Georgia Constitution. 251 F. Supp. at 356.
"9 CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1862) [covering 1833-1873].
" S. REP. No. 11, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. (1862).
21 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 994 (1862) [covering 1833-1873].
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the Senate defeated Sumner's resolution that Stark not be seated
without prior investigation. The Senate then adopted the committee
report and admitted Stark."2
The Act of July 2, 1862, 8s prescribing an oath of past loyalty,
brought a change in congressional practice. As first passed by the
Senate, the "iron-clad oath" would not have been required of Repre-
sentatives, Senators, the Vice-President or the President, 4 and so
would have avoided conflict with art. 1. But all exceptions save the
President were eliminated in conference compromises with the
House. " Its constitutionality was often attacked, 8 but never judi-
cially determined. The Supreme Court, however, did strike down
an act which extended the test oath requirement to lawyers in federal
courts,"7 finding it an ex post. facto law and bill of attainder."8 The
oath was repealed in 1884.39
While it was in effect, both houses excluded elected candidates
for disloyalty, determining that the candidate could not swear truth-
fully.4" It is unclear from the debates whether this procedure was
considered warranted by the act; contradictory support was of-
fered.41 In one case, the House Committee on Elections paid lip
service to the theory that enumerated qualifications are exclusive
while disqualifying a candidate. 2 In the two cases in the House,
"2 CONG. GLOnE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 994 (1862) [covering 1833-1875].
This action was, however, taken "without prejudice to any subsequent pro-
ceeding in the case." The Senate thus agreed with its committee's position
that though a member-elect could not be disqualified for prior disloyalty, he
might be expelled. In 1796, The Senate had decided it had no jurisdiction
to consider crimes alleged to have been committed by a member before elec-
tion, 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 59, 60 (1796) [1789-1824]. It has never explicitly
asserted such jurisdiction, though it did conduct hearings on such a matter
in the case of Senator Gould, 68 CONG. REc. 43, 5914 (1926).
Ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1862), required the candidate to swear that he
had never borne arms against, or voluntarily supported the enemies of, the
United States.
8, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2861, 2872 (1862) [covering 1833-
1873].
"Id. at 3012.
"See, e.g., McKee v. Young, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 422, 434 (1868) (minority
report).reAct of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424 (1865).
" Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
" Act of May 13, 1884, 23 Stat. 21, 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1965).
"'Phillip F. Thomas, Hupman Elec. Cas. 40 (1868); Smith v. Brown, 2
Bart. El. Cas. 395 (1868); McKee v. Young, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 422 (1868).
"' CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 320-30, 632-35, 653-62, 678-86, 1144-
56, 1169-75, 1205-10, 1232-43, 1260-71 (1868) [covering 1833-1873]; 1
HINDS §§ 449, 451.
2 In refusing to seat the candidate who received the second highest num-
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strong minority reports were filed, attacking the procedure.3 Three
other House candidates during Reconstruction were investigated be-
fore being sworn; all were seated." That the House felt constrained
to relieve R. R. Butler of his "disability" under the oath before
even administering it to him45 indicates that the act, rather than a
concept of inherent congressional power, was the basis for the Re-
construction disqualifications.
With the extraordinary exception of the Whittemore case,4" the
House, in 1870, returned to the practice of seating a member on a
mere showing of prima facie right. 7 When a candidate was first
challenged because of his polygamous marriages, this procedure was
regarded as well established. Subsequent to George Cannon's be-
ing seated, the Committee on Elections reported that it had no power
to question his qualifications beyond these expressly stated in the
Constitution, thus following (though not citing) the Stark case. 9
Reconstruction departures from these limits were distinguished as
special inquiries which "did not relate in the remotest manner to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the claimant under the Con-
stitution.""0 The committee did not explain what power Congress
had relied on in those cases, and the question was again avoided
when, nine years later, Congress decided to exclude the same person
for the same offense. It was emphasized that Cannon was a delegate
from a territory, which Congress had power to regulate; no power
ber of votes, the Committee said: "This house can only be 'the judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of its members,' that is, can judge whether
each member has been elected according to the laws of his State and posses-
ses the qualifications fixed by the Constitution. Here its power begins and
ends." Smith v. Brown, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 395, 404 (1868) (Emphasis added).
" Id. at 412, 434.
"Zeigler v. Rice, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 871 (1870) ; R. R. Butler, 2 Bart. El.
Cas. 461 (1868); Symes v. Trimble, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 370 (1868).
'" CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3183 (1868) [covering 1833-1873].
" B. F. Whittemore resigned from the House when expulsion proceed-
ings were begun against him; when he was re-elected to fill the vacancy thus
created, the House refused to seat him. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
4669-74 [covering 1833-1873]. Because of the unusual circumstances and
the fact that debate was not permitted on the question, the Whittemore case
has been found of no precedential value. 1 HINDS § 477; S. REP. No. 1010,
pt. 2, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1942) (minority report).
' Tucker v. Booker, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 772 (1870) ; Whittlesey v. McKen-
zie, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 746 (1870); 1 HINDS §§ 461, 465.
'82 CONG. REc. 7, 8 (1873).
'1 HINDS § 468.
°1 HINDS § 495.
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was claimed to exclude a Representative on such extra-constitutional
grounds.51
However, the House ignored the limitations in these cases in
1899, when Utah, since admitted to statehood, elected another polyg-
amist. It referred Brigham Robert's credentials to a special com-
mittee before seating him.52 The committee's majority based its
recommendation of exclusion on three propositions :3 that the House
had an "inherent" right existing "of necessity" to exclude law-
breakers; that there was precedent for the exercise of that right;4
and that such action was authorized by a special statute dealing with
polygamy.55 The minority disagreed on every point, and recom-
mended expulsion rather than exclusion.56 But the majority pointed
to the first Cannon case as evidence that a member once admitted
under similar circumstances had not been expelled. It doubted
whether Congress had the power to expel for conduct not connected
with the office.57 Despite the strong arguments of the minority,
Roberts was excluded.58
Victor Berger, a former Representative, was challenged in 1919
under section three of the fourteenth amendment,59 for his anti-war
" 13 CONG. Rzc. 3045-75 (1882).
52 33 CONG. REc. 53 (1899). The House thus bypassed its Committee on
Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress,
which reported, on a different matter, that the House could not demand
qualifications other than those specified. H.R. REP. No. 2307, 55th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1899).
2 33 CoNG. Rzc. 1073-84 (1900).
" The majority relied on the Act of July 2, 1862, and the Niles, Thomas,
Stark, Whittemore and Cannon Cases. It ignored the constitutional chal-
lenges to the Act, and the first Cannon case, denying its precedential value.
In addition, reference was made to several state cases, but these dealt with
either qualifications fixed in the constitutions, or administrative, rather than
legislative, offices. 1 HI NDS § 477.
"The Edmunds Act, 22 Stat. 30 (1882), 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1965), pro-
vides:
That no polygamist . .. in any Territory, or other place over which
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction... shall be eligible
for election ... to or be entitled to hold any office ... in, under, or
for any such Territory or place, or under the United States.
The Act was held constitutional under Congress' power to regulate the
territories in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). But its applicability
to a State seems questionable.
" 33 CONG. Rzc. 1085-1100 (1900). They found the concept of "in-
herent" legislative right negatived by the intent of the constitution's drafts-
men, and distinguished cases cited by the majority.
" 33 CONG. REc. 1072-1084 (1900). See note 32 supra.
5533 CONG. REC. 1217 (1900).
"
t No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
1967]
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editorials in a socialist newspaper. He was excluded, the committee
finding that the amendment added a new qualification to the Consti-
tution."0 This case was distinguished in the principal case as one
involving treason, one punishment for which is disqualification.61
Berger, when re-elected, was excluded twice more.6
2
The House has not since disqualified a claimant on extra-consti-
tutional grounds. The Senate has not done so since the Thomas
case. Reed Smoot, another polygamist, was challenged in 1904, but
he was allowed, and kept, his seat. The Senate overruled its commit-
tee by finding expulsion, not exclusion, the proper course of action in
such a case.63 Again in 1942, the Senate rejected a majority report
and seated William Langer, accused of moral turpitude prior to his
election. 4
Theodore Bilbo was challenged on several grounds in 1947.
Senator Taft thought the issue was whether Bilbo's actions "void
the election,"0 5 which would place the case among those involving
Congress' express constitutional authority to judge elections. At any
rate, though the majority in Bond v. Floyd rely on Bilbo's case as
precedent, 0 no conclusive action was taken. The credentials were
tabled when Bilbo's ill health rendered him unable to defend him-
self,' and his death mooted the question.
This review of contested-election cases involving unpopular or
criminal acts committed prior to election reveals no development of
congressional power to disqualify on these grounds. Rather, it seems
to indicate that, in the few instances either house took such action,
it did not rely primarily on its judicial function. And, after each
such exercise, it ignored or distinguished the case and reaffirmed its
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 3.
6058 CoNG. Ric. 8223 (1919).
61251 F. Supp. at 355 (dissenting opinion). This conclusion seems justi-
fied by the debate, e.g., 58 CONG. REc. 8237 (1919).
" 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 56(1935).
"41 CONG. REc. 3429 (1907).
"William Langer, Hupman Elec. Cas. 140 (1942).
"93 CoNG. REc. 17 (1947).60251 F. Supp. at 341.
6793 CONG. REc. 109 (1947).
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constitutional limitations. The most recent statement by a congres-
sional committee on the question will illustrate its present status:
The only rule presently in effect in the United States Senate
which defines standards relating to the right of a member elected
on the face of the returns whose right to a seat is challenged is
derived from the Constitution of the United States and is as
follows: [quoting art. I, § 5] .... There are no other statutory
enactments, rules, standards of ethics, or laws undertaking to de-
fine the right of the Senate to deny a seat to any duly elected
candidate....
* * , Since no standards exist, it would be grossly unfair now
to formulate those standards "after the fact" for retroactive ap-
plication .... 68
The principal casq, in upholding a broader exercise of power,
quoted the Supreme Court in Re Chapman to the effect that a legis-




But in that case, the Court construed a contempt statute as applicable
only to those who refuse to cooperate in "matters within the juris-
diction of the two Houses of Congress,170 and cited an example
where Congress had overstepped its limits. 1' Since then, the Court
has plainly asserted that there are constitutional bounds beyond
which the legislature may not venture in its exercise of the power
of investigation."2 In oral argument on appeal of the instant case,
the Attorney-General of Georgia noted that Bond v. Floyd is a case
of first impression before the Supreme Court. But as in the investi-
gation cases, "the controversy ... rests upon fundamental principles
of the power of Congress and the limitations upon that power. '78
The Court has developed a practice in cases questioning the constitu-
tionality of legislative investigations which is relevant here. Where
the exercise of that power runs the risk of infringing protected
rights, Congress and its committees will be held to a strict observance
,' S. REP. No. 647, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
166 U.S. 661, 668 (1897).
"Old. at 667.
"
1Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the first case to challenge
Congress' power of compulsory process, found the subject matter of the in-
quiry involved beyond the reach of a legislative investigation.
72 DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) ; United States
v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 117 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
"'Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 182 (1957).
1967]
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of their own rules. 4 Such procedure would seem peculiarly appro-
priate where the rule is imbedded in the Constitution itself. The
Georgia Supreme Court has not interpreted this section of the state
constitution, but the section is a copy of the federal constitutional
provision. By adopting the interpretation of the Georgia Constitu-
tion urged by the dissent in the principal case, and supported by the-
history delineated above, the Supreme Court could follow its policy
of avoiding, where possible, the federal issues involved. 75
HUGHa B. ROGERS, JR.
7, Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Yellin v. United States,
374 U.S. 109 (1963); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Chris-
toffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
"' Immediately prior to printing of this note, the Supreme Court reversed
on first amendment grounds. Bond v. Floyd, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4038 (Dec.
5, 1966). Agreeing with the majority below on jurisdiction, a unanimous
Court, per Chief Justice Warren, held that disqualification of Bond because
of his statements violated his right of free expression. Bond could not have
been convicted of inciting violation of the draft law, and he was willing to
take the required oath to support the Constitution. The state may not de-
mand from its legislators a higher standard of loyalty than it may constitu-
tionally require of its citizens. Allowing a majority of his fellow-repre-
sentatives to pass judgment on Bond's sincerity in swearing allegiance would
have a chilling effect on dissent. The "manifest function" of the first amend-
ment is to fan, not quench, the fires of debate. The Court concluded by
stressing the benefits afforded by directing this encouragement to legislators
as well as to citizens: the constituency is better informed, better able to
judge its spokesmen, and better represented in government. Since it found
the Georgia Legislature's action in conflict with the first amendment, the
Court did not decide the other issues raised.
It seems clear that the Justices regarded this as an "easy" case when
brought within the focus of the first amendment. To support its assertion
that Bond's statements could not have been the basis for criminal convic-
tion, the Court simply referred to three cases, declaring "no useful purpose
would be served by discussing" them. 35 U.S.L. WEEK at 4043. The cases
selected from out of the welter of free speech decisions of recent years were,
as may be expected, chosen for their aptness and emphasis. Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversed a Smith Act conviction obtained under
instructions which did not distinguish advocacy of an abstract principle
from incitement to action. So, in the principal case, the Court pointed out
that Bond's attack on the Selective Service System fell short of encourage-
ment to violate the law. Yates was one of the cases "explaining" the require-
ments for prosecution under the Smith Act, following Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), a case which had modified the "clear and
present danger" test. Most observers thought that test had been removed
from the judicial toolbox, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment. 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 191, 213. But in Bond, two apparently orthodox "clear and
present danger" cases were cited: Terminiello v. Chicago, 337, U.S. 1 (1949)
(reversing a breach of peace conviction), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962) (reversing a contempt conviction). Where the problem is de-
termining the point at which speech can become criminal, the Court seems
['Vol. 45
